Since the turn of the century, no parole board has been abolished outright. In terms of sentencing structures, a review at the state level shows there is no such thing as a purely indeterminate sentencing system in which the full duration of a prison sentence is left to the discretion of a parole board. Nor can a pure determinate sentencing system be found. Most jurisdictions exhibit features of both for designated categories of crimes or offenders.
In classifying the status of paroling authorities, it is helpful to begin by noting the essential structure of these contrasting types of sentencing systems Rhine, Petersilia, and Reitz The length of term will be fixed by one or more decision makers who exercise later-in-time release discretion in a way that is neither routinized nor reasonably knowable in advance. The length of term may be adjusted by one or more decisionmakers who exercise later-in-time release discretion in a way that is routinized and reasonably knowable in advance.
What these definitions suggest is that to some extent designating a sentencing system as one or the other involves judgment. In fact, different sources arrive at varying decisions relative to which states reflect an indeterminate or determinate sentencing structure Lampert and Weisberg ; Lawrence ; Stemen et. States that have abolished their parole board or dramatically curtailed its discretionary authority to grant release are also classified noting the year legislation was enacted or became effective resulting in a largely determinant sentencing structure.
As the chart shows, a majority of states, a total of 34, have retained the function of parole release housed within indeterminate sentencing systems in which judges impose a maximum sentence and parole boards determine release dates for most inmates.
Under both types of sentencing structures, corrections officials exert an impact through decisions affecting good time provisions or their equivalent, unless such credits were rescinded in the transition to greater determinacy in sentencing. Paroling authorities in states which retain discretionary authority to grant release typically do so tied to the expectation that a period of parole supervision will follow. In determinate sentencing jurisdictions, two additional pathways for exiting prison, likewise involving post-release supervision, are available: mandatory release from prison, and supervised release.
Those leaving incarceration via these pathways do so after serving a fixed period of their original sentence, minus good time or other credits accrued during confinement. Its proponents claim that it also leads to greater fairness, because when the legislature sets a determinate sentence and judges have little discretion, people who commit very similar crimes receive very similar sentences.
Indeterminate sentencing, however, is making a comeback in a time of prison overcrowding and lower crime rates. More room for judicial or parole board discretion is being let back into the sentencing systems of many states, especially for drug crimes, where rehabilitation is seen as a reasonable and attainable outcome for many convicted offenders.
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Market Your Law Firm. Lawyer Directory. The role of the parole board, implicit in an indeterminate sentencing structure, was abolished under the new sentencing framework. Under a determinate sentence, there was no longer a need for a discretionary parole release.
However, the parole board maintained its discretionary release authority for offenders serving indeterminate sentences -- those convicted and sentenced to crimes committed prior to July The sentencing reform also reduced the amount of "good time" credits that could be earned for sentences over five years, thereby increasing the time served by about 20 percent.
Appendix A contains a description of statutory "good time" credits available to certain sentenced inmates. The General Assembly also began establishing mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses and enacted the first in a series of persistent offender provisions, which allowed for enhanced penalties for repeat offenses of serious crimes. National experience with a determinate sentencing structure resulted in sizeable increases in prison populations.
At the time determinate sentencing was adopted in Connecticut, the incarcerated population was already at design capacity levels, and the correctional system could not accommodate an influx of inmates. In , the Sentencing Commission reported to the legislature the new determinate sentencing law was not producing its intended effects and had instead contributed to the growing prison and jail overcrowding problem.
According to the commission, the percentage of inmates in prison for serious felonies remained constant, but the number and percentage of inmates confined for less serious, non-violent and even misdemeanor offenses increased significantly. The average sentence length for less serious felonies also dramatically increased.
Without the ability to balance the offender's criminal history and correctional needs by imposing a minimum term with the victim's and the public's demands for punishment by imposing a maximum term, the court was imposing sentences that were somewhat higher than the pervious customary minimums, thereby increasing time served. Overall, sentence lengths increased by about 25 percent.
The total impact on the correctional system became clear when increased sentence lengths were multiplied by the thousands of offenders sentenced to prison each year.
The reduction in crediting "good time," another effect of the sentencing reform, added to the overcrowding problem.
Under the prior "good time" law, sentences were generally reduced by a third for an inmate's good behavior. After the law change, sentences were reduced by about 25 percent. Emergency release to relieve overcrowding. The legislature enacted an emergency release provision in that authorized the Department of Correction to petition the court for the release of accused and sentenced inmates to relieve overcrowding. The law failed to address the problem.
While DOC petitioned the court for the release of inmates, only one inmate was discharged under the new program due to the court's reluctance to reduce sentences. Politically, declaring an prison overcrowding emergency was also not an option. Supervised home release. A second legislative approach to the prison overcrowding problem was an early release program, called supervised home release SHR , created in Through this program, discretionary release authority was shifted from the now defunct parole board to the correction department.
The SHR program quickly became a mechanism for dealing with prison overcrowding, and eventually the legislative intent of the program and the overall criminal sentencing policy were undermined by the correction department's need to free prison beds for incoming inmates.
Due to the lack of beds, most sentenced inmates were serving only about 10 percent of their court-imposed sentences before being released on SHR. Because of this, many offenders opted for prison sentences over community supervision, such as probation.
Amended emergency release provision. In , an amended emergency release provision was adopted to allow DOC to declare an overcrowding emergency when the incarcerated population exceeded percent of capacity for 30 consecutive days. It could then systematically release inmates based on specified criteria until the population fell below percent of capacity.
However, this policy also failed. Despite several years of sustained and severe prison overcrowding, an emergency was never declared and no inmates were released under this provision. Sentencing guidelines. By , 17 states and the federal government had adopted sentencing guidelines.
These guidelines shift sentencing power from state judges to legislators. To determine the proper sentence, judges follow a grid, which identifies what the proper sentence is for a person who has committed a specific crime and who has a certain criminal history score based on the number and severity of prior criminal convictions.
Congress passed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Act in , which eliminated parole for federal prisoners, limited early release from prison for good behavior, and curtailed the discretion of federal district court judges. Neither federal nor state judges can deviate from sentencing guidelines except when there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances that are not adequately covered in the guidelines. After making such departures from the guidelines, judges must justify them in writing.
The impact of sentencing guidelines. Advantages of guidelines include an opportunity to reduce sentencing disparities, the potential for ensuring rationality in sentencing for example, making sure that violent crimes are punished with the most severe penalties , and a chance to alleviate prison overcrowding by calibrating the guidelines in a way that reserves prison space for offenders who have committed serious crimes or who have a long history of criminal involvement.
But sentencing guidelines vary, and not all guidelines yield the same benefits. The federal sentencing guidelines, for example, have been subjected to sharp criticism. Lynn Branham, a research scientist at the University of Illinois, claims the federal guidelines are based on the assumption that incarceration is the only fitting punishment tough enough for offenders.
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